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Honn's 1962; Moscow's 1747, 1774; London's 4654, 4671.	
Department believes there remains advantage in preserving our long-held	
position on form of proceeding to Summit meeting, i.e., through Foreign Minister	
meeting which has dealt in substance with some problems at least, as indication	
of strength our basic approach to negotiations and to dampen Soviet enthusiasm	
about their capabilities for shaping form of negotiation. While we inclined	
agree that any siseable Soviet concession is unlikely occur except in meeting O	
at which Khrushchev speaks for Soviet Union, Foreign Ministers' meeting could Could have value of setting forth in understandable fashion both to Soviets and world	
public merits of Western position. It could also give some indication of what	
we might be faced with re Soviet positions in subsequent Summit meeting.	
RM/R As British have pointed out intervening time between present and proposed	
Anal Commit meeting can be advantageously used in conditioning public	
Rev Spinion. 'May Foreign Ministers' meeting provides both time	
The state of the s	and forum.
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(in draft) EUR - Mr. Kohler S/S-Mr.	MCELBAMM F
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
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The residual serious value: from Foreign Ministers meeting it should be generally and state to be seen as a substance. Thus we prefer in our reply to the section of the foreign and the section in the section of the foreign in the section is supported to the section of the foreign indicate that sugh is appropriate.

agenda for Foreign Ministers' meeting clearly raises great difficulty. It must be acceptable to Soviets while giving us opportunity broaden range of questions considered. At same time any language suggested must not give public impression that major unreciprocated concession has been made by West re agenda. Language suggested in US draft note was taken from Macmillan-Khrushchev agreed communique as meeting these requirements. Main element in negotiations themselves, of course, is what Western Powers are prepared assert as their interpretation of phraseology agreed upon and program of discussion they will insist upon at meeting. While we do not insist on specific mention of reunification on formal agenda as matter for discussion by Foreign: Ministers it difficult see how there could be discussion peace treaty drafts or principles without commission consideration of subject. Department recognizes difficulty suggested in Moscow's 1774 for Foreign Ministers in fixing agenda for mit meeting if reunification discussion becomes pointed issue at Foreign Ministers' meeting. However Department has some question about Khrushchev's willingness or capability deal with reunification at Summit meeting since he would be called upon to make dencessions concerning system in East Germany, particularly re human rights, which should be applicable by analogy to/Soviet bloc systems but which he could not afford permit. Department believes any concessions he might make, in any event, would be result of pressures on him on specific issues rather than emerging as his

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voluntary contributions toward compromise. Since our present objective in negotiation is at minimum to develop better public posture, and much of effort in formulating proposals is directed to this end, such clarification of present status of reunification issue as can be attained at Foreign Ministers' meeting would seem have some value all around.

Re Bonn's 1962, excerpt from Soviet note of March 2 re access was included in our draft with idea making clear expressed intent of Soviet Government itself and thus underscore its consequent responsibility if it were to conclude separate treaty with GDR. Balance of para was designed reaffirm our refusal tolerate GDR interference with access. Re Moscow's 1774, Department agrees unilateral Soviet action to hinder access is unlikely before negotiations begin. But negotiations and preparations therefor may extend over considerable time and draft note's language was meant point out to Soviets detrimental nature of such an act at any time in process.

Re Polish and Czech participation we understand UK now prepared agree this matter should be, in first instance, dealt with as suggested in US draft. In view difficulties connected with additional western as well as eastern participation, we prefer handle it this way at least for now.

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